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Exploring the relationship between the global and the local in media and communications studies has 
been a focus for international communication scholars for decades. Scholars have focused on where 
production takes place, on the ownership and control of corporations, on flows between nations, and on 
the impact of content on audiences and cultures. Theories of dependency and media imperialism gave 
way in the 1990s to theories of cultural globalization and hybridity. Empirical studies of production and 
consumption have developed new insights into what happens on the ground and contemporary scholars 
have become more interested in concepts that attempt to overcome the dichotomy of the global/local 
and instead focus on the transnational and the translocal. In related fields, like economic geography, the 
focus has been on regional and local innovation economies. The relationship between place and cultural 
production has become more complex with globalization and some scholars have become more attuned 
to the social and political construction of place as a result. 
As in other media sectors, it is clear that the global/local opposition may be unhelpful in 
understanding the production of digital games and how key actors act transnationally. In order to 
understand how transnational corporations specialize their operations, we need to attend to the ways 
through which these corporations act in multiple sites. This is not to suggest that the nation-state is no 
longer important, but rather to state that to understand transnational games production we need to 
consider how transnational corporations compete, cooperate, and lobby in pursuit of their interests and 
 259 
how states and other political entities facilitate, regulate, and collude in these actions. While 
corporations are headquartered in certain locations, and that remains crucial for them, they may pursue 
their interests in a range of locations. 
Europe is an important market for the global games industry but more importantly for this 
chapter, it is an important center of game development. However, despite the increasingly global nature 
of games development, the control of the industry is in the hands of a relatively small number of 
corporations (Kerr 2011). The games industry, particularly the video games subsector,1 is largely 
controlled by a small number of publishing and techno-publishing corporations headquartered in the 
United States and Japan. Despite this, transnational game corporations are increasingly establishing 
branch offices in Canada, Eastern Europe, and China or acquiring successful production studios in 
dispersed locations. Even in countries with historically strong local-development cultures, like the United 
Kingdom, the majority of employment in development studios is now in companies owned by 
transnational corporations (Games Investor Consulting 2008, 9). To a more limited extent, we are also 
seeing the expansion of Chinese and Indian transnational games corporations into Europe through 
mergers and acquisitions. We see examples of horizontal and vertical integration, of changing degrees of 
local/foreign ownership, and of rationalization and movement of workforces. If anything, these forms of 
economic expansion and concentration have been accelerating in the past decade producing an 
extensive network of production centers controlled from a limited number of locations. This is clearly 
economic globalization with companies moving to the cheapest-cost locations (often Eastern Europe), 
locating near to market, or acquiring new technology and knowledge. Production and services are the 
most dispersed activities, with publishing somewhat less so and tending to locate in capital cities. These 
patterns of dispersal mirror to some degree the activities in other cultural industries, particularly film. 
However, a second, but less examined trend is also evident and this has much more to do with 
politics than with economics. In the past decade and a half, we have seen the establishment of industry 
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trade associations at national levels to lobby local and regional governments in relation to the 
introduction of national and local supports for the industry, and at the European level to lobby the 
European Commission (EC). Entertainment software associations have also been established in the 
United States and Canada to lobby against content regulation and for state/region and federal financial 
supports. These formal institutions are a form of alliance where corporations develop their common 
interests and coordinate their activities locally and transnationally. This chapter is interested in this new 
form of political transnationalism whereby multinational and local games corporations collaborate to 
pursue their interests locally, as well as transnationally, via nationaland regionaltrade associations. I 
consider how the industry is further institutionalizing a boundary between publishers and developers by 
establishing separate trade associations and how culture is employed strategically in the discourses of 
these organizations. 
In order to examine these developments, this chapter focuses on the parties and discourses 
involved in the decision by the EC in 2007 to allow France to introduce a tax credit system to aid 
developers of certain types of video games. This chapter is based on a critical reading of the EC decision, 
third-party submissions, and press releases released by the various trade associations. It attempts 
through these documents to identify the actors and to interrogate the discourses they employ. This is 
not a straightforward state versus industry situation, but rather trade associations for publishers, trade 
associations for developers, individual corporations, and various public and public/private bodies 
interacting to shape an emerging discourse around support for European game production and games as 
a cultural product. In order for countries to justify such state aids under European trade and competition 
law, they must establish a cultural test and justify it in relation to the European cultural exemption rule. 
Financial supports for national film industries in Europe, for example, have historically done this. 
This chapter attempts to go beyond the structure of the global games industry, which I have 
examined elsewhere (Kerr 2006), and political economic studies of the industry in particular countries, 
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to explore specifically how some actors are acting both transnationally and (trans)locally. To some 
degree, this chapter puts aside the theoretical argument of whether or not the games industry is a 
cultural industry (elsewhere, I have argued that it is). It also puts aside the legal technicalities of 
classifying digital games as a cultural industry, which others can more adequately address (Graber and 
Burri-Nenova 2010). Instead, it focuses on actors, discourses, and politics in particular national and 
regional contexts and how these actors attempt to shape how digital games are perceived, measured, 
and regulated. Beyond acquisitions, subcontracting, and labor movement between firms, the most 
visible form of institutional extension and networking of corporate power appears to be via national and 
supranational trade associations. 
The Politics of Cultural Production and Policy Making 
As Vincent Mosco (2009, 175) points out, the political, in political economy, often gets marginalized or 
indeed ignored as scholars focus on the activities of particular corporations and countries. This 
translates into a lack of attention by academics to policy making more generally (Hesmondhalgh 2005, 
97). The focus instead has been on media ownership, corporate mergers, revenues, and sales. However, 
the power of corporations may have been overstated, and the role of other types of national and 
regional institutions and the politics of their relationships understated. Indeed, Mosco (2009) argues, 
that while nation-states have a changed role in relation to the media and communication industries, it is 
not always reactive. Indeed, it may also be constitutive. Certain nation-states and other fora may invite 
corporations and other actors into the policy process. In the recent World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) talks, transnational corporations were given sovereign status and sat alongside nation-
states and civil society in policy debates (Sarikakis 2008, 101). 
Des Freedman (2005) in his research on media policy making in the United Kingdom and the 
United States points out that lobbying of state policy makers by professional stakeholders has grown 
exponentially in the past few decades. The growth in numbers of lobbyists, however, does not equate 
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with greater transparency or equal access by all. It would appear that certain constituencies are given 
greater access, particularly if they provide “impartial” statistical or legal arguments to support their 
case. In a recent report, he concludes that there is “a relationship between industry and government 
that is marked by its intimacy, lack of transparency and shared objectives” (7). He also argues that it is 
dominated by a market ideology. Similarly, Sandra Braman (2006) has argued that we are seeing the 
development of new institutions, treaties, and laws (structural power) at national and international 
levels, which are introducing and reinforcing certain concepts, practices, and ideologies (symbolic 
power). For her, we are seeing new forms of information power exercised via both formal and informal 
mechanisms, and by latent and invisible policy making. Raboy and Padovani (2010) argue that lobbying 
and advocacy are two of the “less formal, latent, and often invisible processes” through which decision 
making is informed. 
In the past ten years, we have seen calls from a range of actors to increase regulation of game 
content and access to it. In the past five years, we have seen increasing calls from the games industry for 
public support in order to protect employment, improve graduate skills, and to protect/maintain game 
production in Europe. One institutional vehicle for promoting the call for local/national/regional support 
for the games industry has been industry trade associations. In this chapter, I consider trade associations 
as one way through which multinational corporations lobby for the further development of locational 
incentives and as a channel through which transnational and local corporations communicate their goals 
and interests to national governments. The goal for these actors is the reduction of costs and to deflect, 
or reduce, the threat of regulation. A key cost for the games industry is labor and while the industry 
does not necessarily have to locate in high cost cities, as in many cultural industries, the project-based 
nature of the industry has meant that they do need access to a highly skilled local labor pool. The 
increasing cost and risk of high-end projects also means that companies are looking for support to offset 
the research and development costs of new projects. 
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Locational incentives and labor costs are issues that have been examined in detail by scholars 
looking at the film and television industries. While the time scale and logistics of production are 
different, it would appear that the issues of labor costs, labor contracts, and locational competition in 
relation to production and certain near to market services are similar. Miller et al. (2001 and 2005) have 
developed the concept of a new international division of cultural labor, or NICL, to capture how 
Hollywood exerts control over the global film and television production industry. They argue that 
“cultural production has mostly relocated within English-language IMECs (industrialized market 
economies) as factors of production, including state assistance, lure business” (2005, 122). For them, the 
NICL accounts for the greater differentiation of cultural labor, the globalization of labor processes, the 
means by which Hollywood coordinates and defends its authority over cultural labor markets and the 
role national governments play in collusion with them (120). In their examination of runaway 
productions and coproduction agreements, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, they argue that 
governments may be “enabling external domination” by “commodifying locations as industry settings of 
sites and services” (138). Further, they state that certain governments facilitate transnational mobility 
by increasing local labor market flexibility and by reinscribing and destabilizing national cultural criteria 
(177).2 
Mark Banks in The Politics of Cultural Work (2007) argues that critical scholars like Miller et al. 
focus too much on large corporations and the macro level without sufficiently interrogating the 
mechanisms through which cultural production becomes embedded in particular locations. In this 
chapter, I turn attention to some of these embedding mechanisms at the national and European level. 
This is not to assert that there is a straightforward influence of the global corporation on the 
local/national, but rather to trace some of the ways by which global corporations become embedded in 
different contexts and how they pursue their interests politically. As Marwan Kraidy (Kraidy and Murphy 
2008) has pointed out in another context, “a richer notion of the local should enable the exploration of 
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power relations within the local and not focus exclusively on power as exercised by the global on the 
local” (339). Thus, in order to understand the politics of game production in Europe and particularly the 
activities of transnational corporations, we need to go beyond national borders to understand how the 
local is constituted and reconstructed in practice. 
The Institutional Politics of Game Production in Europe 
L. Hjorth (2008) points out that “in a period marked by transnational flows of people, ideas, and capital, 
the politics of regionality is indeed a vexed issue” (4). While she was writing about game production in 
Asia-Pacific, any analysis of games production in Europe needs to attend to the varying national and 
local cultures of production as well as the larger European legal, economic, political, and cultural 
context. According to Johns (2006), we can identify three supraregional game production contexts: 
North American, Europe, and Japan, which are demarcated by technological, economic, social, and 
cultural barriers. However, these practices and technologies underplay the complexities within these 
regions and the fact that the European Union (EU) is comprised of 27 member states stretching from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea north of Turkey. While labor may move freely within the EU and 
associated states, and the Euro currency circulates within a smaller number of states, there are 26 
official languages and 60 indigenous languages. The EU is also a unique political institution with a 
democratically elected Parliament and a Council of 27 commissioners at the core. While strategic 
economic and trade issues are framed largely at an EU level, cultural, educational, and media policies 
are still largely a matter for national governments. 
The United Kingdom and France have two different systems of government and two different 
approaches to policy for their cultural industries. The Department of Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) 
in the United Kingdom is responsible for the “creative industries” and a discourse of innovation, 
research and development, intellectual property (IP) rights, and skills dominates in relation to new 
media. This is not a discourse of subsidies and grants or culture but rather one of innovation and 
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enterprise. The UK government rejected calls for a specific tax credit system for the video games 
industry in the United Kingdom in 2011 but in 2012 the government launched a public consultation on 
the issue. To date the focus of policy has been on improving the business climate for companies through 
research and development tax credits and general business supports.In 2011, the DCMS has its budget 
cut. . 
By contrast in France, games have long been accepted as part of culture and have received grant 
support for the development of new production projects. The Ministry for Culture in France has not had 
a budget cut and public financial supports for the French games industry under the Fonds d’Aide au Jeu 
Vidéo (FAJV) are operated by the Centre National du Cinéma et de L’image Animée (CNC) and the 
Ministère de L’économie, de L’industrie et de L’emploi. This fund provides subsidies, grants and loans to 
aid preproduction, new IP generation, industry seminars, and so on (see http://www.cnc.fr/). The 
French approach to supporting local game production continues a long tradition in that country of public 
support for cultural production in an attempt to redress the balance of trade with importedcultural 
products. While the legitimation for such supports may differ from other countries, such supports are 
not specific to France, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries supporting local 
cultural production through a variety of financial supports, as Miller et al. (2001) details. 
As stated above, globally the control centers of the games industry are in the hands of a small 
number of multinational publishing and technology companies headquartered in the United States, 
Japan, South Korea, and China. This is particularly the case in relation to console games. Therefore, 
Europe is largely a center where development of games and consumption takes place but not 
necessarily where the value generated by the IP is retained. A recent European report noted that “the 
UK is the absolute leader (in Europe) with 23 out of the 27 European top ranking (development) studios” 
(de Prato et al. 2010, 149) although national reports in the United Kingdom point to the fact that over 
half of employment in the UK industry is in foreign owned companies (Games Investor Consulting 2008). 
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In publishing, France leads the way in Europe and Ubisoft is the only European game publisher that 
ranks in the top-five global publishing studios (de Prato et al. 2010, 52). As a company in the top five, 
they play a particularly strong and interesting role in terms of the development of French and EU policy 
for the video games industry. The Nordic countries are also an important center of development, 
particularly of PC and massively multiplayer online games, and both Iceland and Norway have 
introduced specific policies to support their games industries. 
In both the United Kingdom and France in the past decade, we have seen the development of 
separate professional game developer and game publisher associations to present their perspectives to 
local, national, and regional governments. We have also seen the development of pan-
European/transnational associations to lobby European policy makers at an EU level. The Interactive 
Software Federation of Europe (ISFE) established in 1998, is the European body for game publishers. It is 
registered in Belgium as an international association with scientific and pedagogical purposes, according 
to their website. The European Game Developers Federation (EGDF) was established somewhat later in 
2006 to represent the interests of development companies and is registered in Sweden. The EGDF is a 
federation of national trade associations while ISFE has company as well as national trade associations 
as members. In trying to understand why these associations were established, we can look to a 2002 UK 
government report which noted that a key issue for the industry was a lack of understanding and 
appreciation of the size and value of the industry, a perception that jobs in the industry were “not a 
proper job” and that games were generally perceived as “violent, anti-social” and a “waste of time” 
(Spectrum. 2002, 23). Another factor may have been the desire of national and European policy makers 
to deal with unified industry associations rather than multiple interest groups. 
These associations support their institutional formation with a range of activities but a particular 
focus is on the dissemination of information and data about the value of the industry to the national 
economy and consumer surveys showing the degree to which people play games in each country. On 
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the ISFE website, the key issues identified are antipiracy, age rating of games, and education (which 
refers to games in education and teaching with games). On ISFE’s website, they state that they aim to 
create better awareness of the interactive software industry as a key player in the European 
economy and as a new vector of European culture; confirm the role of the interactive software 
industry as a responsible industry by improving various means to inform European consumers 
on the content of its products and their suitability for different categories of age; establish a 
source of information for its members and the media on industry data and relevant legislative 
and technical developments of all kinds through market research on legitimate and pirate sales, 
press releases and seminars; support national representation in all EU Countries and fight 
against piracy. (see http://www.isfe-eu.org/) 
The United Kingdom’s games industry publishing association, UKIE (Association for UK Interactive 
Entertainment), states that it wishes to “champion the interests, needs and positive image of the 
videogames and interactive entertainment industry” and to foster “the right economic, political and 
social environment needed for this expanding industry to thrive.” They go on to state that they build 
“strong working relationships with parliamentarians and policymakers to ensure industry needs are met 
through appropriate government support” and that they have a “dedicated intellectual property crime 
unit” which “seeks to minimise the damage caused by intellectual property theft and catch those 
responsible for this criminal activity.” Finally, they work with ISFE “to ensure our members are aware of 
key EU developments and to promote the priorities and interests of the industry in Europe” (see 
http://www.ukie.info/about). 
Meanwhile The Independant Game developer Association (TIGA), in the UK notes that it “exists 
to represent and to serve the interests of games developers and associated business.” Its vision is to 
make the United Kingdom the best place in the world to do games business. They focus on three sets of 
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activities: “political representation, generating media coverage and developing services that enhance 
the competitiveness of their members” (see www.tiga.org/What-We-Do.aspx). The European Game 
Developers Federation (EGDF) states that it is “committed to the stimulation and development of a 
stable, vibrant and creative European games development sector that is competitive globally and 
recognized culturally” (see http://www.egdf.eu/). The subtle shift at the European level to include 
culture is deliberate, as we will see in the deliberations over the French tax credit system. The lack of it 
at the national UK level appears to reflect the local state discourse of innovation and enterprise. In their 
bylaws, the EGDF also states that it has a special focus on the interests of “independent developer 
studios” (see http://www.egdf.eu/EGDF_Bylaws.pdf). 
While both UKIE and TIGA want to promote a positive image of the games industry, where they 
diverge is in relation to the types of member services they offer. TIGA focuses on discounts to attend 
international conferences, running seminars, negotiating deals on services, and labor supports. UKIE 
focuses on IP theft and catching those responsible. A second divergence is in terms of their membership: 
the EGDF explicitly states that it promotes the interests of independent developer studios and is a 
federation of national state associations. ISFE promotes the interests of the interactive software sector. 
Its membership includes “thirteen major publishers of interactive software and thirteen interactive 
software trade associations throughout Europe” (see http://www.isfe-eu.org/). A third divergence is in 
relation to their use or not of the term culture to refer to the products and services the industry 
develops. UKIE is not in favor of any supports that conceptualise games as cultural products.3 
Mosco (1996) points out that political economists have often examined the boards of directors 
of transnational corporations to establish the relationships between different companies and the degree 
of concentrated power among board members. An examination of the board of directors of the national 
and European games publishing associations finds a remarkable degree of overlap. Five companies are 
on both the boards of UKIE and SELL,4 the respective trade associations for game publishers in the 
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United Kingdom and France, and ISFE, the European Publishers Association: Activision Blizzard (US), 
Disney Games (US), Electronic Arts (US), Nintendo Europe (Japan), and Sony Computer Entertainment 
Europe (Japan). A further three are active in the British and French national trade associations—
Codemasters (India/UK), Sega (Japan), and Ubisoft (France)—while one individual, Ian Livingstone, life 
president of Eidos, which is now owned by Square Enix (Japan), is active on the board of both UKIE and 
ISFE and was one of the authors of a recently released British report on skills for the video games 
industry in the United Kingdom commissioned by the National Endowment for Science, Technology, and 
the Arts (NESTA 2011). Ubisoft is the only European top-five publisher active on UKIE, SELL, and ISFE, 
while the only other European publisher on the board of UKIE is a representative of Mastertronic who 
serves as chair. In fact, the chair of UKIE represents the only British corporation on the board of UKIE. 
What is striking about the national and European publishing associations is the dominance of a 
small number of large transnational corporations mostly from the United States and Japan. There 
appears to be a lack of local companies from the countries concerned, a lack of companies operating 
solely in the mobile, online, and massively multiplayer online games (MMOG) space, and a lack of 
nonmarket companies involved in serious and educational games. This may help to explain first, the 
degree to which the policy agendas of both national and European transnational-based game 
associations coalesce around certain issues, and second, how these agendas are dominated by labor 
flexibility and cost issues. While the overall agenda in terms of reducing costs of production is shared 
with the developers’ association, the arguments and tools are different. For developers, the argument in 
favor of state support is justified in terms of conceptualizing games as audiovisual/cultural goods and 
services and therefore in terms of the social and political necessity to support local cultural production. 
This argument supports the view that narrative, language, and story are important features of games. It 
seeks to situate games in policy terms alongside film, television, and other media sectors. For the 
publishers, games should be as conceptualized as software or interactive entertainment. Their argument 
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focuses on the interactive features of games and attempts to situate games in policy terms alongside 
other software products. The key goal here is to avoid any classifications that might make games subject 
to content, quality, and distribution regulations in place in Europe in relation to audiovisual and cultural 
products. The distinctions being made by these associations are reminiscent of the early debates in 
game studies between narratologists and ludologists, but they have very real economic implications for 
the parties involved. Since Ubisoft is both a publisher and developer, in the following context, we will 
see that they broke rank with their fellow publishers and acted to support the development of a French 
policy to support games production that views games as a cultural product. 
The French Tax Credit Scheme for the Creation of Video Games 
In 2005, the French government notified the Directorate General (DG) for Competition of the European 
Commission that they planned to introduce a scheme whereby certain types of video games could 
qualify for a tax credit in France. The scheme constituted state aid under EU treaties and therefore 
France needed to inform the EC of the details of the scheme and the EC needed to decide if it could be 
allowed under European law. Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, and in particular derogation 87(3)(d), allows 
for certain state aids to be developed if they aim to promote culture. The EC accepted in a statement in 
early 2006 that certain video games “might constitute culture” within the meaning of this article and 
what was at stake was the selection criteria used by the scheme and the type of content (EC C297/20 
7/12/06). They, therefore, called on interested parties to submit comments within one month (EC 2006). 
Industry associations at all levels in Europe made submissions and while all were in favor of “aid in 
support of creation of videogames,” where they differed was in terms of the “legal, economic and 
factual bases” (ISFE 2007) for this aid. In these submissions, we see the contrast not only between 
publisher and developer associations but also between the French and British state approaches to the 
industry. 
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It is important to state that the initiative for this scheme lay with what is described in the official 
documents as the “French authorities.” The process took two years and involved a number of 
submissions by interested parties and a meeting between representatives of three transnational bodies 
in Europe—the EC, the ISFE, and the EGDF. Four national trade organizations TIGA (UK), Bundersverband 
Der Computerspielindustrie (G.A.M.E -Germany and Austria), Asociación Española de Distribuidores y 
Editores de Software de Entretenimiento (aDeSE - Spain), and Association des Producteurs d'Oeuvres 
Multimeda (APOM - France) were involved and one transnational French company, Ubisoft. While the 
documents are not completely transparent, the final, published decision document details the parties 
who submitted comments and their various positions. The actors marshaled rhetorical arguments, legal 
precedents, legal treaties, and statistics, and appealed to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression in their submissions. Intriguingly, or perhaps 
somewhat depressingly, no mention was made in the decision to any academic studies on the cultural, 
media, or interactive aspects of video games. 
The following is an excerpt from the decision that summarizes the official positions of the 
European game development association and similar developer associations in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France and was supported by the French publisher/developer UbiSoft. The complex 
translocal nature of game production and the importance of the national headquarters as a location of 
control are evident here given that Ubisoft supports the arguments of the national and European game 
developers associations, rather than its fellow publishing corporations. This highlights the fact that 
transnational corporations may act locally in some instances and transfer allegiances between 
transnational associations. 
Ubisoft, TIGA, GAME, APOM and EGDF stress that, in their view, video games are cultural 
products. They emphasise that games in general are one of the oldest cultural traditions of 
mankind and underscore its interactions with other fields of culture, namely the cinema, music 
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and the plastic arts. They present video games as being audiovisual products that can act on the 
imagination, way of thinking, language and cultural references of players, notably those in the 
15–25 age category. According to them, video games reflect the cultural environment in which 
they are created via the use of language and humour, music, the environment (in particular, 
architecture and landscapes), and personalities (clothing, origin) or via the scenario, the themes 
or stories tackled, or playability. (EC 2008, 19) 
There are good reasons for the developer associations and others to stress the cultural role of games 
since this submission was made to the DG Competition of the EC  who deals with trade issues and 
decides if this support mechanism could be allowed under the EC’s free trade competition treaty. One of 
the few areas where state aidis allowed is in relation to culture when the measure aims “(d) aid to 
promote culture and heritage conservation [but] does not affect trading conditions and competition in 
the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest” (EC 87[d]). Further, this argument 
reflects the local position of cultural policy toward video games in France. Meanwhile, ISFE in its 
submissions is summarized as stating, 
Video games could not be regarded as cultural products but only as interactive entertainment 
products. Whereas a film viewer watches in silence, the main activity of a player is to interact in 
a personalised manner with the game, the story told by the game not being of any real 
importance. Unlike films, video games are not designed as a vehicle for ideas or cultural 
messages. Indeed, their main value resides in playability and in interaction with the player or 
players. ISFE stresses that video games must be regarded as software and not as audiovisual 
products. It also challenges the idea that the alleged artistic expenditure may represent more 
than 50% of the expenditure on a video game’s concept. According to ISFE, it is instead the 
software expenditure—clearly linked to playability—that exceeds all other expenditure and 
represents up to 70% of production costs. ISFE also claims that the tax credit demonstrates a 
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misunderstanding on the part of the French authorities of the real nature of video games. (EC 
2008, 20) 
This position reflects that of publisher associations in the United States and Canada. However, the 
website of UKIE, a constituent member of ISFE, notes that video games are “a new vector of European 
culture.” While this stops short of arguing that video games are cultural products, it points to the 
oscillating positions of the actors when it comes to arguing for or against policies and legislation, in 
relation to video games. 
Most of the data referred to in the EC decision was submitted by ISFE and the French authorities 
or obtained from the OECD and the European Audiovisual Observatory. The decision referred to a 
number of treaties and previous legal decisions but one of the key documents noted is UNESCO’s 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which was 
incorporated into EC law in May 2006. What is remarkable about the appeal to this document is that 
UNESCO is truly a transnational—or indeed, one might say global—organization and the development of 
that particular convention was a multistakeholder initiative, which included civil society (see Raboy 
2010). This compares favorably to what Raboy calls the G8 and OECD “clubs,” or indeed associations like 
ISFE and the EGDF. While there is some mention of third parties in the EC decision on the tax credit, it is 
notable that UNESCO was the only body in this process where civil society actors were involved. There is 
no mention of engagement with academics. The decision notes (EC 2008, 64) that video games “may 
constitute cultural products” but that this conclusion “in no way prejudges the classification or 
description of video games resulting from national or international standards.” 
The tax credit with amendments was finally passed in 2008 and contained detailed “verifiable 
national” cultural criteria and a selection test to be used in deciding what game projects could be 
supported. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity in EC treaties, these tests and the application 
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of the scheme was assigned to the relevant public authority in the member state. A first report on the 
scheme published in 2009 stated that 45 companies met the criteria of “quality, originality and 
contribution to cultural diversity” in the first round of projects to receive tax breaks. It was stated that 
the measure would generate between €30 and €40 million for the studios operating in France and 90 
percent of the estimated €170 million spent on the projects was spent within France (SNJV. 2009). The 
president of Syndicate National De Jeu Video (SNJV –formerely APOM), was quoted as saying, “I hope 
that our experience will help fellow representative bodies across Europe convince their governments to 
not only put in place a similar tax credit, but also encourage all to pursue the lobbying work that we 
initiated in Brussels . . . all videogames, regardless of nature, are a form of cultural expression and 
European game creation must now urgently be preserved” (Lee 2009). Meanwhile, the publisher 
associations ISFE and UKIE continue to assert that games should be seen as software and interactive 
entertainment and not as cultural products. 
Conclusions 
What can we learn about the politics of game production from the development of the French tax credit 
system for video games? First, publishing and developer trade associations in the games industry are 
opposed in the matter of whether or not video games constitute cultural products. This position has to 
do with avoiding content and access regulations developed for cultural industries in Europe. However, 
even publishers will break with this position if they are located in the national territory in which they 
might benefit. Thus, the discourse of corporations varies according to certain local and national 
opportunities. Second, the games industry is increasingly mobilizing its resources to lobby at the 
national and at the European level. We are seeing a political extension of transcorporation and 
transnational networks of power in the guise of professional associations. This is in response to not only 
the perceived negative image of games and the threat of regulation, but also because public policy 
makers appear to want to interact with unified industry associations rather than individual corporations. 
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However, we need to ask to what degree these trade associations actually represent the entire industry 
or only certain interests within the industry. A small number of transnational corporations are central to 
the publishing associations at national and European level and appear to have privileged access to policy 
makers. There also appears to be a high degree of overlap in the membership of these associations 
between regions. Third, the focus for all industry actors is clearly on reducing the costs of production, 
whether it is in relation to labor costs or in terms of financial supports to encourage production. 
Arguably, the locational politics of games production is only just beginning but it is clear that lobbying is 
increasing at local, national, and European levels. 
What we see in the French tax credit case is the initiation of policy by a public state authority 
and its mediation and shaping by the EC with inputs from industry. From a policy perspective, one sees 
the importance in European deliberations of legal instruments, legal precedent, and statistics and the 
irrelevance, or at least the absence of, academic work. A discourse of free trade and market imperatives 
dominate discussions, which is not surprising given that the scheme was submitted to DG Competition. 
However, a cultural discourse was also appealed to. The EC noted the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity  and the UNESCO position that games constitute a 
cultural industry and that some games contribute to cultural diversity was accepted. The EC also noted 
that games can be both a cultural product and a software/entertainment product or service although 
this is limited to some, rather than all, games. The final issue is that the details of the cultural tests are 
developed at a national level and this scheme is implemented by the French authorities with periodical 
reviews at EC level. It remains to be seen which types of projects and companies actually benefit from 
this scheme. 
National funding of game production, albeit only those with a cultural dimension, is a new 
departure in Europe. At first glance, this appears to be completely at odds with the more recent ruling in 
spring 2011 by the US Supreme court that reaffirmed free speech protection for video games and 
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rejected attempts by policy makers to intervene in the sale of adult video games. If more countries and 
developer associations adopt the “French” approach, we are likely to see more public intervention in 
content development in return for funding. What is unclear is the impact this will have on games. Will 
we see more cultural diversity in games or will these measures lead to narrow culturally nationalist 
games? Regardless, transnational corporations will likely relocate, or establish branch operations, in 
those contexts with the most attractive cost/benefit location, akin to runaway productions in the film 
industry. Both publisher and developer associations are likely to continue to lobby local governments to 
introduce more financial supports but less regulation. What is clearer at this stage is that in the EC case 
no academic input was solicited, while in the US Supreme court judgment, the validity of academic 
findings on the effects of violent video games on minors was questioned. Game studies still have to find 
their place in the new political configurations. 
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1 I use video games here to refer to the subsector of console games. 
2
 A later publication by Miller (2011) notes that the digital games industry “incarnate the centralized labour of 
production” (94) and that publishers “develop exploitative labour practices” as well as using non disclosure 
agreements and job threats to discipline workers (95). 
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3
 Vincent Scheurer has suggested in a speech at the Develop Industry conference in the United Kingdom in July 
2011 that UKIE and/or a transnational games publisher may have actively lobbied against the introduction of a 
games tax relief system in the United Kingdom on the grounds that it might lead to a more “restrictive trade and 
legal environment” for games. See http://www.sarassin.net/. 
4
 Syndicat des Editeurs de Logiciels de Loisirs (SELL) is the French trade association for game publishers. 
